In the event of World War III, will India head towards another 1962-war like rout? The dilly-dallying and dalliances as opposed to strong alliances that India is undertaking, suggest so. This need not be so if India follows some simple principles of military strategy. In this blog post, which has excerpts from several sources, I will emphasis why partnerships and strong alliances with like-minded countries is necessary to avoid such a scenario.
Of all the four major powers that India deals with for protecting its strategic interests---US, EU, Russia, and China---it is the US and EU alone which actively as an official policy seek to propel India’s growth in the economic and military spheres. They may have their personal interests to do so---a check to the assertion of malevolent Chinese intent---but the lengths to which both US and EU can and will support India’s rise is ultimately geared towards India’s interests.The second cold war between the US and China started a couple of years back and
is here to stay. Not recognizing this fact will cloud India’s judgement towards
taking decisions in the national interest. Indians, right from the government
to the individual always strive for strategic autonomy. But this does not
guarantee security. No matter how well armed you are, in the end security comes from being part of a grouping, and not from going the lone wolf's way. What brings security is the ability to recognize who your friends are
and who your foes are. PM Modi ji works from the heart and forges alliances
based on personal chemistry. You can see PM Modi in several photographs with
Vladimir Putin and Xi Zinping in warm bonhomie. But geopolitical alliances are
made on the basis of cold, calculating, hard fact-based decisions emanating
from the head. Deep thinking, objectivity, and sound reasoning should always
get precedence over sentimentality and emotionality. China and Russia know the
weaknesses of Indian leadership, and they are exploiting it to the hilt.
This plan deliberately invokes the legacy of the Cold War.
While U.S. officials have been reluctant to frame the rivalry with China in
these terms, their apprehension ignores a simple reality: China adopted a Cold
War strategy against the U.S. long ago. “It does us little good to repeat again
and again that we aren’t seeking a new Cold War when the CCP [Chinese Communist
Party] has been stealthily waging one against us for years,” former Deputy
National Security Advisor Matt Pottinger testified before the newly established
House Select Committee on Strategic Competition between the United States and
the Chinese Communist Party in 2023.
To win the New Cold War, this plan calls for sustained U.S.
economic growth, greater political will, stronger external partnerships, secure
borders, synchronized economic and security policies, resilient supply chains,
enhanced military deterrence, and U.S. energy independence. It articulates the
steps necessary to protect the homeland, protect U.S. prosperity, diminish
China’s capacity to harm the U.S. and hold it accountable, reorient America’s
defense posture, and exercise global leadership.
Finally, this plan simultaneously exposes the Chinese
Communist Party’s aggressive tactics against the U.S. and represents a
call-to-arms for all segments of U.S. society, including state and local
governments, the private sector, the American people, and U.S. allies and
partners abroad.
“Winning the New Cold War: A Plan for Countering China” is
divided into three sections.
Part I describes the rationale for the plan, examining the
current state of the New Cold War between China and the U.S., weighing
respective strengths and weaknesses. Recent trends driving the CCP to act with
more aggression abroad and more repression at home are likely to continue,
particularly after Xi Jinping secured a third term as the head of the Communist
Party in 2022, consolidating power and sidelining what remains of opposing
factions.
Part II, the heart of the plan, exposes the People’s
Republic of China’s (PRC’s) aggressive tactics against America and proposes
U.S. policy responses across dozens of fronts: from banning CCP lobbyists to
arming Taiwan, from enhancing nuclear deterrence to expanding export controls,
from addressing China’s role in the fentanyl crisis to shutting down illegal
CCP police operations in the U.S.
Part III summarizes key action items from Part II and offers
guidance for implementation by the U.S. government. Contending with an
adversary as capable as the CCP will require close coordination between the
executive and legislative branches, federal agencies and law enforcement, state
and local governments, U.S. allies and partners, and the private sector. Above
all, proper implementation of the plan will require leadership from the White
House and a National Security Council capable of effectively operationalizing
the President’s vision.
Summary of Key Recommendations
To protect the U.S. homeland, the U.S. must:
Stop Malign CCP Activities in Higher Education. The
executive branch should ban, at a federal level, all Confucius Institutes, as
they are sponsored by the CCP, and all collaborations between U.S. institutions
and Chinese entities affiliated with China’s Ministry of State Security or
other security and intelligence agencies. The U.S. State Department, which
conducts background investigations of student visa applicants, should deny
citizens of the PRC, and those of other U.S. adversarial countries, access to
Department of Defense–funded research programs.
Crack Down on Illegal Chinese Police Operations in the
U.S. The Department of Justice should reinstate the China Initiative and
immediately shut down illegal CCP police operations in the U.S. It should
ensure that these operations, which predominantly victimize Chinese Americans
and Chinese nationals living in America, are a focus of a revitalized China
Initiative.
Ban Dangerous Chinese Apps. Under the authority of
the powers given to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States
(CFIUS) through the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act of 2018,
Congress should direct CFIUS to continuously review the activities of all
Chinese mobile app companies and recommend specific apps to be banned on
national security grounds. TikTok should be immediately banned in the United
States.
Engage State and Local Governments. State governments
must prevent Chinese companies from obtaining contracts to build critical
infrastructure, resist purchasing Chinese products and technology that can pose
espionage or national security risks, limit and roll back nefarious PRC
activities on U.S. university campuses, encourage public funds—particularly
pension funds—to divest from problematic Chinese entities, prevent the purchase
of sensitive land or property near critical infrastructure or strategic
farmland by PRC agents, and identify and halt lobbying of state and local
governments by Chinese agents.
Prevent Malicious Land Use. Congress should require
that the U.S. Department of Agriculture be included in the CFIUS process for
reviewing land purchases by adversarial countries. The Department of Homeland
Security should define and locate critical infrastructure that could be
affected by proximity-based purchases of land near military installations and
facilities of concern.
Ban CCP Lobbyists. Congress should ban lobbying by
agents of the Chinese government, passing legislation that requires lobbyists
representing Chinese government-controlled companies to register as foreign
agents. Congress should also pass a law that prohibits foreign agents from
lobbying representatives or agents of U.S. national or sub-national government
entities on behalf of these companies or the Chinese government.
Ensure Border Security and Immigration Enforcement.
To curb the flow of Chinese-origin fentanyl into the U.S. and secure America’s
sovereign borders, Congress must fully fund thorough border and immigration
enforcement and close loopholes in the system that have long been exploited by
cartels and illegal traffickers.
Address China’s Role in the U.S. Drug Crisis. The
U.S. should sanction individuals and entities in China, Mexico, and the U.S.
that are involved in enabling the trafficking of fentanyl and other synthetic
opioids and rigorously enforce the sanctions regime.
Ban the Import and Sale of Chinese Manufactured Drones.
Congress should reinsert language preventing federal government acquisition of
Chinese drones in the next National Defense Authorization Act and sign it into
law. In anticipation of a legislative solution, the White House should implement
a ban on the federal purchase and use of Chinese drones through executive
order.
Protect the U.S. from Life Science and Biotechnology
Threats. Congress should appoint a blue-ribbon commission of
security-cleared, non-governmental experts to assess the military-related life
sciences and biotechnology threats emanating from China. The CIA’s recent
creation of the China Mission Center and Transnational and Technology Mission
Center should address biotechnology threats as part of a broader focus on
addressing dual-use life science threats.
Recalibrate America’s Defense Posture to Meet the China
Threat. A Naval Act of 2023 should authorize and appropriate the funds
necessary for a large block purchase of naval assets for a total of $152.3
billion before anticipated savings. Ships covered by this purchase should only
be those with approved, stable designs and that are in production today at
numbers already stipulated in the current Future Years Defense Program that
runs through 2027.
Enhance Nuclear Deterrence. The U.S. should increase
the size of its nuclear arsenal by more quickly utilizing its capacity to
transfer additional warheads to deployed forces in crisis scenarios and by
planning to procure more modernized nuclear systems. The U.S. needs to develop
additional capabilities tailored specifically to deter China, investing in the
development of a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-N) and accelerating
timelines for developing new warheads and increasing production of plutonium
pits for storing nuclear warheads.
Urgently Increase Munitions Production and Arm Taiwan.
When the Administration sends capabilities that are backlogged for Taiwan to
other places, it should be required to justify the decision to Congress with
full transparency about the trade-offs to deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. It
should use the drawdown authority in the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act to arm
Taiwan with critical munitions to fill the gap until delayed platforms are
delivered.
Foster Innovation in the U.S. Maritime and Shipping
Sectors. Congress should repeal and replace the antiquated Jones Act with a
naval act that makes American shipping globally competitive. Any revolution in
shipping must consider redesigning twenty-foot-equivalent-unit (TEU)
containers, allowing new, more competitive means of managing, packaging, and
shipping goods.
Align National Security Spending with National Security
Priorities. Congress should require the Administration to double the share
of foreign assistance spending in the Indo–Pacific within two years, bringing
the Indo–Pacific to approximately 15 percent of annual foreign assistance.
Congress should consider establishing an Indo–Pacific companion to the
Assistance for Europe, Eurasia, and Central Asia account with a dedicated line
item in appropriations legislation.
Expand Export Controls. The Bureau of Industry and
Security should provide written justifications and public testimony to relevant
congressional committees on previous and future rulings on granted licenses for
exports to China since 2018. After a review, Congress should decide if
transferring export-control authority elsewhere is warranted. Congress should
also authorize at least one national security agency in the export-control
license decision-making process to veto license approvals to malign PRC
entities.
Restrict Outbound Investment into China. The U.S.
government should insist on greater disclosure by American funders of
significant investments in China. For large-scale investments in critical
economic sectors, the U.S. government should require American entities
investing in China to submit information on their counterparties and
anticipated use of funds for approval prior to investing, under a presumption
of denial. This includes joint ventures with PRC entities.
Counter Xi’s Big Data Ambitions. In the immediate
term, the Department of Commerce must begin robust implementation of executive
orders relating to the Information and Communications Technology and Services
(ICTS) supply chain, including by publishing and enforcing final ICTS
supply-chain regulations. Congress should enact a personal data privacy law to
protect Americans’ privacy, reform sanctions laws to ensure that relevant data
flows can be blocked under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, and
legislate extended export controls over commercial transfers of data which
threaten national security.
Address China’s Abuse of the World Trade Organization
(WTO). The U.S. government should make the case that China has violated the
1999 Agreement on Market Access between the PRC and the U.S., as well as its
WTO accession commitments, including its commitment not to condition approval
of foreign investments on “the transfer of technology.” The Office of the U.S.
Trade Representative (USTR) should conduct a comprehensive review of China’s
compliance with its WTO commitments, as recommended by the U.S.–China Economic
and Security Review Commission. If the USTR assesses China to be noncompliant,
Congress should consider legislation to revoke permanent normal trade relations
(PNTR) status.
Make Limited Use of Tariffs and Non-Tariff Barriers.
The U.S. government should be less risk-averse in selectively implementing and
enforcing tariffs to punish Chinese predatory behaviors and facilitate
reshoring, nearshoring, and friendshoring.
Hold China Accountable for Its Role in the COVID-19 Pandemic. The U.S. should continue to investigate the origins of COVID-19 and advocate a truly independent, international investigation both to advance the principle of accountability and to better prepare for the future. Until a transparent and thorough investigation is conducted with full Chinese cooperation, the U.S. should suspend funding and cooperation with Chinese laboratories on biomedical research.
Expose CCP Influence Over U.S. Cultural Institutions.
Congress should organize public hearings to shine a transparent light on the
ways in which the CCP coerces U.S. firms operating in China to avoid falling
afoul of the CCP’s policies and priorities. Congress should exercise its
subpoena powers to force senior executives of U.S. firms and cultural
enterprises to explain to the American public the ways in which they have been
coerced to meet censorship demands and questioned on cases in which they
engaged in blatant self-censorship.
Combat Malicious CPP Activity in International
Organizations. The U.S. government should conduct a detailed assessment of
China’s expanding reach in international organizations and the tactics it
deploys to exert influence and advance its preferred candidates to leadership
positions, sharing its findings and coordinating with partners to counter those
efforts. The U.S. should advocate Taiwan’s participation in an array of
appropriate international organizations.
Highlight the CCP’s Abhorrent Human Rights Record.
The U.S. should highlight the CCP’s lamentable human rights record at every
opportunity and offer safe haven by issuing “Priority 2” refugee status to
limited numbers of persecuted Uyghurs and Hong Kongers. The U.S. should also
enforce the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act and identify additional means at
its disposal to shift the CCP’s risk calculus and alter its willingness to
continue its human rights violations.
Address the Persecution of Christians. The U.S.
government should look for ways to support organizations and initiatives that
advocate for Christians and religious liberty in China, such as ChinaAid.
Further, the U.S. should apply Global Magnitsky sanctions and other applicable
sanctions to Chinese officials involved in the torture, sexual abuse, or death
of prisoners who are in state custody because of their religion.
Revitalize the Blue Dot Network. The U.S. should
disaggregate the Blue Dot Network (BDN) from the Biden Administration’s Build Back
Better World and focus on promoting better standards, greater transparency, and
a new vision for regional connectivity. The U.S. should also align aid and
economic engagement agencies in execution of the BDN and support Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development proposals for BDN certification.
Address Illegal Fishing and Maritime Militia Activities.
The U.S. must draft a clear declaratory policy against China’s illegal fishing
practices, directly attributing the fleet’s actions to the CCP. Further, the
U.S. should increase its global maritime presence, enhancing naval and Coast
Guard patrols in the Arctic, in strategically sensitive international waters,
and in the exclusive economic zones of U.S. partners and allies where welcomed.
REFERENCES:
Winning
the New Cold War: A Plan for Countering China | The Heritage Foundation
Chapter
13 | South Asia > National Defense University Press > Charting a Course:
Strategic Choices for a New Administration (ndu.edu)
No comments:
Post a Comment