The impact of interest groups on public policy
Dr. Madsen Pirie
Interest groups impact upon public policy in several ways. Firstly, when legislation is being prepared, those drafting it consider the likely impact upon any specific and identifiable groups. They consider the likely effect on the population as a whole, which is normally beneficial, but also consider any sub-groups of that population which might be adversely affected. A proposal to open foreshore areas to ramblers will benefit those who might take advantage of their new-found rights, but might impact negatively on those who have previously enjoyed exclusive access.
Secondly, the legislators who are to determine public policy will take account of how interest groups might respond to it. Some do this because those interest groups include numbers of their constituents whom the legislator wishes to represent properly, while others take account of the likely electoral impact. All things being equal, they would rather have members of interest groups vote for them rather than against them. Some politicians have made a policy of assembling sufficient support from interest groups to build a majority, even though their support of some interest groups has adverse effects on others.
Thirdly, it is sometimes the interest groups which take the lead in lobbying for legislative changes that will benefit their members. This often takes the form of rent-seeking, in which the aim is to use legislation to secure improvements for their members that would not be attained in its absence. A proposal that hairdressers should licensed, and that only qualified ones should be allowed to practise their trade, is one that brings advantages to existing hairdressers at the expense of those who might otherwise enter that trade in the future. By limiting the numbers of competitors, it facilitates higher prices than would prevail otherwise. Much lobbying for new regulation is of this form, seeking to benefit current practitioners at the expense of new ones. A large established firm can afford the cost of meeting regulatory requirements more readily than can a start-up would-be competitor.
It is also common to see interest groups lobby against proposed changes in public policy because they perceive a threat to the continued well-being of their members, or some undermining of advantages they currently enjoy. A proposal to end academic tenure in the United States might open up many employment and promotion opportunities to young academics, but it would meet with determined opposition from organizations that represent those who either have tenure or who perceive themselves to be on the brink of securing it.
There are, in addition, interest groups composed of those who share an ideological view and who are prepared to defend it against legislative changes that might run counter to it. Those committed ideologically to promoting equality might well oppose any measures which could allow some to prosper more than others and thus bring about greater disparity. Those of a conservative disposition who feel unsettled by change might well be prevailed upon to oppose measures that threaten to upset the status quo and replace it with something unknown. This is not necessarily because they oppose the content of the proposed reform, just that they oppose change itself.
There are many groups who would not accept the description as conservative, but which nonetheless oppose many of the trappings of the modern world. They can be rallied to oppose modern agriculture, genetic modification, new buildings, new modes of transport and new lifestyle freedoms. At the root of some of this might lie a yearning for their own childhood when things were simpler and slower. Many of them feel unhappy with growth and progress, and claim that the new opportunities and choices they present are unnecessary and even counter-productive.
Sometimes ideological opposition to change combines itself conveniently with self-interest. It was 40 years ago in 1973 that I was first asked in the US to delineate the difference between a developer and a conservationist. I was told that a developer was someone who wanted to build a mountain cabin in the wilderness, whereas a conservationist was someone who already had a mountain cabin in the wilderness. Jocular and cynical though the answer is, it does express an essential truth: that many of those who oppose development already have access to enjoyment of amenities, and think these will be degraded if such enjoyment is extended to others.
Whatever the motivation that directs interest groups such as these, they present a serious problem to those who would provide innovative public policy solutions to social and economic problems. Interest groups can thwart useful reforms, and they can also pressure legislators into introducing legislation that imposes costs on others to satisfy their rent-seeking aspirations.
In a democracy the size of an interest group is important, given the need of current legislators to secure re-election, and of would-be legislators to win votes. Size, however, is not paramount. The effectiveness of an interest group can, paradoxically, be inversely proportional to its size in some cases. Consider the fact that in 1850 farmers in the US constituted 64 percent of the workforce. This had dropped by 1900 to 41 percent. The figure today is 1.9 percent. This means that US farmers have in one and a half centuries gone from nearly two-thirds of the workforce to fewer than one fiftieth of it today. Yet few, if any, would dispute that farmers today comprise a far more effective interest group than they did then. There is more pro-farmer legislation on the statute book, and they have more subsidies, supports and special rights than did their much more numerous predecessors. It is easier for farmers’ lobbies to influence legislation now than it was then.
Self-awareness is often of more importance than the numbers in an interest group. If people perceive themselves to be members of a group with known interests, the group itself can be more effective than if people lack such self-awareness. Farmers know they are farmers and stand to benefit from pro-farming legislation. Pensioners know that they are affected by changes to pensions that are introduced. Rural dwellers know they can be affected by changes that take place to the countryside.
Groups which are not self-consciously aware of their status are less effective. If people do not realize how forthcoming legislation will impact upon their interests, they have no particular motivation either to endorse it or to oppose it, and will be difficult to rally on either side. A measure which increases farm subsidies will, in general, command the enthusiastic support of farmers. They can be organized to lobby legislators, to demonstrate, to write letters and to campaign in other ways. The taxpayers who will foot the bill for these subsidies might be many times more numerous, but they are less self-consciously aware of their status. They do not, in general, perceive themselves as losers, and are difficult to mobilize in favour or against specific measures that will affect tax levels.
Sometimes a group which stands to gain or to lose from particular policy proposals might not realize that it is in this position. Those who object to a new power station being built, be they local residents or conservationists, can identify their interest. Their amenity will be downgraded, or their ideological preferences circumvented. They can organize opposition with those similarly affected and constitute an effective interest group. On the other hand, the users of electricity, both present and future, those who stand to gain cheaper and more reliable energy supplies do not see themselves as beneficiaries. They are dispersed and not conscious of their status as beneficiaries. They will not normally organize as a lobby in favour of the power station to set against that which opposes it. They are dispersed and their interest is not obvious to them.
There is a second important asymmetry. It is that the smaller interest group which sees its advantage sees it as significant, whereas the larger group, if they do perceive their disadvantage, see it as relatively small. A subsidy might make a huge difference to the living standards and prospects for farmers, yet cost taxpayers a near-negligible amount, maybe pennies a year. The ones who stand to gain big have more motive to campaign than the larger group which sees its potential losses as tiny.
In this way legislators can act to benefit large numbers of small groups, all of which might be grateful from their gains and campaign for them. And while the cumulative cost to taxpayers might be large, no individual measure is seen as worth campaigning about because the cost of each is small, and it is only the cumulative cost which is large.
Similarly the gains to large numbers from a new proposal might be seen by them as small, even marginal, whereas the loss of value perceived by the small group might be highly significant to them. Thus the small group has a motive to campaign, whereas the large group does not.
A proposal for a new housing estate is seen by local residents as making a big difference to their lives. It might degrade their view and impair the quality of some of their countryside. It will probably mean more vehicles on the roads and more congestion. It might lower the value of their own homes.
On the other hand, those who stand to gain, the people who might live in those new homes, do not usually know who they are. To young people wishing their own home, or urban dwellers who would prefer to live in the country, the one new estate adds marginally to the choices and opportunities open to them, and even this small gain is usually unknown to most of them. A big and perceived loss to a few contrasts with a marginal and unknown gain to the many. This is why such contests are usually seen as being between local residents who stand to lose, against big business developers who stand to profit, rather than against the unknown people who might benefit from the development.
This asymmetry is particularly significant for the Conservative Party. While its leadership might want economic development and growth, including new house-building, many of its MPs represent rural county constituencies whose residents are anxious to protect their existing amenities against the encroachment of new developments. They might recognize a case for new housing and opportunities for young first time buyers, but all of them would prefer to have it take place somewhere else. And all of the somewhere elses added together constitute almost the whole country. This is the famous NIMBY phenomenon.
While the NIMBYs are prepared in principle to see development take place elsewhere, rather than in their own back yard, those whose ideology looks down on growth and development as such, preferring what they see as the measured rhythm of a slower pace of life, do not want any kind of development anywhere. The acronym for them is BANANAs rather than NIMBYs, in that it stands for “Build Absolutely Nothing Anywhere Near Anyone.”
The effect of all these factors is twofold. Firstly it acts as a brake on progress and development. Entrenched interest groups, even though they might constitute a small minority, know their advantage is at stake, and are in a position to campaign, and the adverse publicity they generate can weaken the resolve of legislators to press ahead with the intended reforms. Thus policy proposals calculated to benefit the population in general can be thwarted at the hands of perhaps small numbers who perceive adverse consequences for themselves, and are sufficiently concentrated to be effective.
Secondly, relatively small interest groups can use the political process for rent-seeking activity that acts against the common good. One by one they can impose burdens on the general populace that convey concentrated advantages for themselves, and even though the burden in each case might be small, taken together they can constitute a substantial drain on the resources of the many in order to secure advantages for the few.
The analysis thus far constitutes a critique. It explains why policy proposals which could benefit the many are often blocked, while those that benefit the few at the general expense can succeed. To these effects must be added the insights of Public Choice Theory, that legislators and administrators pursue policies which serve their own advantage, sometimes even in circumstances where this runs counter to the interests of the public they are nominally employed and empowered to serve.
These factors explain why reform can be difficult to achieve and why sometimes policies injurious to the general good are enacted. The critique aids analysis, but does not, of itself, aid innovation. The question arises as to whether there is a creative counterpart to this critique, an approach to policy formulation which takes account of the interest groups involved and somehow manages to neutralize or circumvent their opposition.
The answer is that there is such an approach, and it is one which takes on board the likely responses of interest groups and which incorporates into the proposals measures calculated to prevent or to overcome their hostility.
One such technique is to identify the interest groups that will be affected by a policy innovation, and to build into the proposal measures to protect their perceived advantage. This was done when the Post Office monopoly telephone service was privatized. Rural dwellers were concerned that a telephone service run for profit would be less ready to connect remote country areas, and the county MPs were concerned on their behalf. A requirement was written in to require the new company to connect remote areas, so the concerns were satisfied. Groups representing disabled people worried that a for-profit service might be less prepared to offer the same services to disabled people, so it was made a requirement that the new company must offer such services.
Another technique is to offer affected groups something in exchange for their perceived loss of benefit, something that they value sufficiently to accept it as compensation.
Employees of the Post Office telephone service were concerned that a private company could not offer the same job guarantees as a public body could. Their unions ran a campaign against privatization with posters depicting a pair of scissors cutting the cord of a telephone handset. The company’s response was to offer employees the chance to become shareholders in the new company, and to share its success. Employees were given preference in share applications, and any of them who bought 200 shares was given a further 200 shares free. The union urged its members to oppose privatization, but over 90 percent of them took up the offer to buy shares. The tactic here involved the recognition that the interest group’s leaders did not necessarily represent the opinions of their members. In effect the government bid over the heads of the leaders with a direct appeal to the members themselves.
BT was successfully privatized in what was then the largest share issue in the world. Some consumer groups feared that a BT monopoly would be exploited to the disadvantage of customers, so the privatization created a smaller competitor, Mercury (owned by Cable & Wireless), and BT was required to carry its signals into customers who chose it. This assuaged the consumer groups, the more so when subsequent reviews were built in, at which time the number of permitted competitors would be increased. One consequence is that the UK now has one of the world’s most competitive telecoms markets.
The approach of offering an interest groups something of greater value than the benefit foregone was used in housing policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Some 35 percent of Britons lived in state-owned houses, most at rents well below market levels. The political problem was that they constituted almost a rotten borough, electing legislators who supported subsidized rents at a cost to others paying local and national taxes. The council house dwellers were an interest group well aware of their advantage, and all attempts to move rents towards market levels failed at a political level because state tenants voted against candidates who attempted this.
The new policy was the famous right-to-buy initiative. If people valued their subsidized rents, they might value even more the opportunity to become home-owners at a discounted price. State tenants were offered the chance to buy their own homes, with huge discounts on assessed market values, depending on how long they had lived there. It was, in effect, a capital cost since for a one-off discount on the market price of the property, the government achieved an end to the annual subsidy on it.
Housing and house-building have always been an area in which interest groups impinge on policy. It was true in the past and remains true today. Ministers talk of the need for new homes, appealing to the young voters who might become home-owners, but must contend with the fact that large numbers of new houses will depress the price of the existing stock, adversely affecting current home-owners. Since for most people their home is their most substantial item of saving or investment, their interest lies in rising values not in falling ones. Current home-owners know who they are; future ones generally do not.
The technique of compensating an interest group with something of greater value has been used many times. British Airways, when it was state-owned, needed to slim from 59,000 to 39,000 employees before it could operate efficiently and profitably as a private company. None was threatened with dismissal. Cash sums were offered instead to those prepared to leave voluntarily, and the sums were set high enough to encourage enough of them to do so. Some used the money to achieve long-held desires to set up in business. Again, from the BA point of view it was a capital cost, paying money up front in order to buy more efficient operation in future.
The voluntary and non-confrontational aspect of this approach has led to it becoming almost routine. When local governments or business firms have to slim down owing to financial constraints, it is commonplace now for this to be don by voluntary redundancy, voluntary early retirement, or ‘natural wastage,’ meaning that departing and retiring employees are not replaced. The approach is popular because the interest group is assuaged by this approach and does not cause trouble or embarrassment to the local authority or the business concerned.
The offer to an interest group to compensate them for loss of advantage need not be monetary. People might be prepared to accept greater opportunities for advancement in return for lower job security. It is often the case that the private sector does not provide the same level of job security as its public sector counterpart, but might provide easier opportunities for promotion.
Some people will accept greater independence and flexibility as compensation for a forgone advantage, valuing the chance to exercise more initiative and take more control over the circumstances of their employment. The essential point is to adapt the policy initiative to incorporate some compensatory advantage, monetary or otherwise, to offer to an affected interest group, preferably at a level sufficient to soften their opposition.
The effect of all this is often to make the proposed initiative rather messy, with all kinds of ad hoc clauses included to placate interest groups that might otherwise thwart its passage. This is true, but a messy proposal that succeeds is better than a clean one that fails to be implemented. Sometimes the concessions to interest groups will lower the value of what is being achieved. Again, this is true, and again it is to be preferred to no achievement at all.
There can even be an issue of fairness, with critics saying that the advantages enjoyed by interest groups were unjust, and should not be compensated for. The response to this might be that the compensatory offer is preferable to the continuation of that unjust advantage. When state-owned houses were offered to their tenants, some middle class home-owning Conservatives objected. Their case was that they had bought their houses the hard way, while the state tenants had for years paid below-market rents, made possible by the taxes paid by home-owners. Now the government was offering those tenants a chance to buy at a price below what their house was worth, and they thought this unfair. The answer at the time was that the sale of council houses would end the continuing annual subsidy to support their rent, and that this one-off concession would reduce the demands made on taxpayers in the future.
It undoubtedly entered the thinking of the government of the day that if state tenants became home-owners, they would no longer have an interest in voting for candidates who supported cheap rents, but might now have an interest in voting for candidates whose outlook seemed more favourable to home-owners.
Interest groups founded upon a shared ideology are often more difficult to compensate, since their interest might not be based on any personal advantage, but on a shared view of how society should operate or be constructed. Teachers unions have opposed giving choices to parents or operating independence to schools because they are committed to a view of education in which children are allocated to school based on what are seen as the needs of the community, and in which schools are required to operate in like manner to each other. For similar reasons the unions tend to oppose measures that devolve powers away from local education authorities down to individual schools. There is probably no compensation that could be offered which would wean them away from that position.
There is the possibility, however, that even where an interest group cannot be placated by the offer of alternative or compensating advantages, it might be possible to call into being an interest group that could outweigh them. In the case of the state houses, most local authorities were totally opposed to the initiative which reduced their housing stock and their ability to allocate it. They were, however, outweighed by the new group of state tenants who saw themselves as prospective purchasers, and who had no interest in supporting their local authority’s resistance to the reform.
In the case of school choice, it is unlikely that any advantage offered to the teachers’ unions would placate their opposition, but there are two new groups that could outweigh their opposition by perceiving advantages for themselves in supporting it. The first comprises parents who think their children might benefit if they had free choice between schools. Those previously allocated places for their children in low quality schools would see benefit in being able to choose a better one for them, and like the prospective home-buyers, they would constitute a group much larger than the teachers’ unions, albeit more dispersed and less experienced at lobbying.
The second group is constituted from among the headteachers. Many of them welcome the extra authority which comes with operating independence for their schools. Many relish the chance to make and implement real decisions about how the school should be run, instead of being ciphers for a central authority which sends out detailed guidelines for them to follow. While not as numerous as the teachers; unions, the headteachers generally command the respect of parents in a way that teachers’ s do not.
Thus the combination of school choice and operational independence for schools, while it cannot placate one interest group whose ideology sets it in opposition, can nonetheless conjure up two new groups to outweigh its influence. A policy initiative, if it is to succeed, might therefore first consider how to win over any interest groups who might otherwise stand to lose out from its introduction, and secondly how to create new interest groups to counter-balance those who cannot be won over.
It was in this spirit that the Adam Smith Institute set out to solve the problems of a housing shortage without alienating existing home-owners whose amenity and value might be adversely affected, while securing the acquiescence of many of the environmental lobbies which have hitherto opposed more building.
The proposal began with an overview of existing land use in Britain. Some 90 percent of us live in urban areas, and we occupy 8.6 percent of the total land space to do so. Nearly three-quarters of Britain (72 percent) is classified as ‘open space,’ and 11.6 percent is forested.
The popular vision of a green and pleasant countryside does not always accord with the reality. Much land, including land in the green belts, is used for intensive farming, with large monoculture fields of crops much as wheat or rapeseed. UK farms have a very high level of productivity, backed up by intensive use of fertilizers and pesticides. They do not provide a diverse habitat for wildlife, and are not particularly environmentally friendly.
The ASI proposal is to convert 3 percent of farmland in England and Wales over a 10-year period. The land would be converted in the following ratio: 90 percent would be given over to new woods and forests. 5 percent would be for housing, and 5 percent for supporting infrastructure. Thus a total of 0.15 percent of farmland would become housing, and a further 0.15 percent for infrastructure. The remaining 2.7 of that 3 percent would become wooded.
The principal change would see tree cover increase by 130,000 hectares, an increase of 11 percent. The proposal is for the creation of diverse woodland, including small streams and lakes, providing a habitat for animal, birds and insects, and considerably friendlier to the environment that much of the agriculture it would replace.
The remaining tenth of the 3 percent of farmland converted would allow 950,000 homes to be built, together with supporting infrastructure. This would make a considerable impact on the nation’s housing shortage, giving more opportunities for young and first-time buyers, and providing many more opportunities for those wanting to live in rural areas. It would create new jobs in rural areas and boost the nation’s economy at the same time. Interest groups which seek a vibrant rural economy with jobs available for young people there should welcome this.
Existing home-owners in the countryside constitute the biggest potential interest group opposed to new housing there, but they are offered something in return. Fairly unsightly and unfriendly fields of monoculture would be replaced by woods with attendant wildlife. None of the new houses need be overlooked by existing houses. Instead of their view being spoiled by the sight of new houses, current countryside dwellers would find it improved by the new woods created.
Environmentalists and conservationists who would normally object to new building in rural areas are offered something in return. The new woods would be friendlier to the environment than the crop fields they replaced, and would provide a diverse habitat for wildlife. Furthermore, the reduced use of fertilizers and pesticides, combined with the carbon absorbing effects of the extended tree cover, would count as a considerable environmental improvement.
People who are ideologically opposed to all development, growth and human activity would not be satisfied, but many environmentalists would accept the trade, regarding the new homes built as an acceptable price for the environmental gains of the new woodland. There would be a very small loss of green belt land, but in compensation there would be major environmental improvement of other green belt land, nine times more than any lost.
It is quite common in disputes involving potential rural development to have winners and losers. Usually it is either the developers or the conservationists who win, the one at the expense of the other. This proposal, by contrast, is deliberately structured in such a way that there is something in it for most groups to come out ahead, with only a tiny group unsatisfied because it conflicts with their ideology. The other groups can all benefit, and this includes the building firms, the would-be home-buyers, current rural home-owners, those wanting to sustain the rural economy, the environmentalists and conservationists who seek less chemical pollution and an improved environment for plants and animals, and those who simply want the countryside to look nicer. It is structured so that nearly everyone can come out as winners.
This process of identifying the interest groups and incorporating measures to build in their support or to at least mute their opposition is not a particularly easy one. It is comparatively straightforward to identify interest groups that might stand to lose out from a new policy initiative. Indeed, some will step forward to identify themselves by noisy opposition to the proposals. But the process of thinking up and incorporating measures that might assuage them is less straightforward. It is essentially creative activity that requires the flashes of invention and insight that are required for new ides to emerge. It is by no means a deductive process or one that can be carried out by following a formula.
Nonetheless it offers a way round the impasse which is caused when groups which stand to lose an advantage currently enjoyed will campaign to thwart new policy initiatives that might benefit the many. It minimizes the conflict which reform proposals can cause, especially in controversial areas such as development and land use change, and it does this by making allies of its potential opponents. By identifying potential opponents before the proposals are set in final form, and by co-opting them with bolt-on measures for their benefit, it smoothes the path for desired reforms without the rancour and adversarial politics that reforms can often trigger.
There are two extras. This approach promises to shorten the time that reform measures can take as they make their way through the inquiries and court procedures normally put in their path. And finally it has the additional effect of increasing the number of policy initiatives that make their way safely through onto the statute book or into implementation. Whether or not you regard that as a good thing depends on how satisfied you are with the current status quo and how ready you are to accept that reform need not always be for the worse.
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The Role of Civil Society Organizations in Promoting Good Governance
By Idumange John
Being a Paper Presented At a One -Day Government/Civil Society Interactive Session Organized By:
The Office of the Senior Special Assistant to the Governor of Bayelsa State on Civil Society on Thursday, 2nd August 2012 @ the Banquet Hall, Government House, Yenagoa, Bayelsa @ Time: 4.00pm to 6.00pm
Only by participating in the common intelligence and sharing in the common purpose as it works for the common good can individual human beings realize their true individualities and become truly free -------John Dewey, Liberalism and Social Action
Introduction:
Since the dawn of participatory democracy, the rights of citizens such as the freedoms of expression and of association are seen as sacrosanct. Often these rights are written in a constitution or other public documents. When people freely exercise these rights by volunteering to forward a valued cause, or by protesting a government policy, they do so as part of civil society. This lends credence to the assertion of Abbie Hoffman who said many years ago that: 'Democracy is not something you believe in or a place to hang your hat, but it's something you do. You participate. If you stop doing it, democracy crumbles”
A significant problem in most developing countries is over-centralization of decision making and the lack of stakeholders involvement that permit patronage of powerful special interests and high levels of corruption. Scholars are agreed that lack of stakeholder buy-in attenuates the policy process, decreases efficiency and this in-turn affects economic growth. This is where civil society can play a major role by contributing to greater transparency and accountability [2]
Civil society is a "space" whose function is to mediate between the individual and the State While there may not be a clear cut definition of civil society, they more or less agree that it comprises institutions such as religious organizations, labour unions, charities, community groups, nonprofits, and the media. In advanced and virile democratic systems these institutions supplement formal processes such as voting and help citizens shape the culture, politics, and economies of their nation.
On February 14th 2012, Hon. Henry Seriake Dickson was sworn in as Governor of Bayelsa State. On assumption of office, he pledged to operate an open government – with transparency and accountability as beacons of leadership. One of the challenges this administration has had to grapple with is the opaque process of governmental transactions. The administration met an empty treasury, a bloated wage bill and an inexplicable debt burden. This prompted the setting up of the 11-man Bayelsa State Financial Review Committee with a mandate to look into the finances of the State. It was also revealed that most of the loans obtained by the previous administration were dead-weight loans, which were used in a frivolous manner and not for the execution of development projects. In spite of massive misappropriation of public funds, a huge debt burden of N207billion was left behind. Vouchers were inundated with “Ghost Names” wage bill was bloated and it was corruption incorporated. To turn the tide in favour of an accountability and transparency, government had to take steps to promote a transparent regime.
One of such steps was the initiation of the Bayelsa State Transparency Bill 2012, which was passed into law. The purpose of the Law is to make it obligatory for all tiers of government (State and LGAs) to publicly declare to Bayelsans, all revenues that accrue to them as well as a summary of expenditures. Since then government has been consistent in discussing its policies and finances publicly with her citizens, the organized civil society and the media. This push for transparency has placed a burden on the third-tier of government to do monthly transparency briefing. All political office holders are also enjoined to do so. Governor Henry Seriake Dickson underscored the importance of a transparency when he said:
On transparency, we believe that it is the right of the people of the state, to know what funds accrue to the coffers of the state and the various local government councils and how they are utilized. This is the only way to secure the trust and confidence of the people in whom sovereignty lies. I have directed all local government chairmen to comply with this paradigm shift on the issue of transparency, probity and accountability, to reflect the new Bayelsa we are building”. [3]
The Restoration administration has entrenched transparency, accountability and service to abolish the business-as-usual scenario which had hitherto characterized the MDAs. The underpinning philosophy is to ensure that sustainable development is premised on strong institutions, which will constitute the locomotive for sound policies and programmes delivery. Whether defined as Dicksonomics or Seriakenomics, the underlying principle is to ensure that policies and programs are implemented without hiccups and with huge direct and spill-over benefits on the people.
From Aristotle to John Locke and from Tocqueville to Lincoln, participatory democracy has been a feature of human society since classical times. Participatory democracy creates opportunities for all members of a population to make meaningful contributions to decision-making, and seeks to broaden the range of people who have access to such opportunities. Across time and space, it is believed that effectively increasing the range of participation makes for better efficiency and effectiveness in government and by extension solidifies legitimacy. [4]
Being a former Attorney General of Bayelsa State and a law maker at the highest level of government, Governor HSD assumed office with a clear goal of increasing peoples participation in the decision making process of government. It was for this reason that the Governor established the office of Senior Special Assistant on Civil Society, ostensibly to provide avenues for government–Civil Society interaction. Such interactions are avenues for political power holders to clarify policy issues and programme direction to involve all segments of society along the road to change.[5]It is the desire to operate an open government that has made this interactive session between government and civil society possible.
What are civil society organizations?
“Civil society [6]is a sphere of social interaction between the household (family) and the state which is manifested in the norms of community cooperative, structures of voluntary association and networks of public communication … norms are values of trust, reciprocity, tolerance and inclusion, which are critical to cooperation and community problem solving. Structure of association refers to the full range of informal and formal organizations through which citizens pursue common interests” (Veneklasen, 1994). Civil society is composed of autonomous associations which develop a dense, diverse and pluralistic network. As it develops, civil society will consist of a range of local groups, specialized organizations and linkages between them to amplify the corrective voices of civil society as a partner in governance and the market” (Connor, 1999).
CSOs are formed by people who have common needs, interests and values like tolerance, inclusion, cooperation and equality; and development through a fundamentally endogenous and autonomous process which cannot easily be controlled from outside.
Civil society has been widely recognized as an essential 'third' sector. Its strength can have a positive influence on the state and the market. Civil society is therefore seen as an increasingly important agent for promoting good governance like transparency, effectiveness, openness, responsiveness and accountability. Civil society can further and improve good governance, first, by policy analysis and advocacy; second, by regulation and monitoring of state performance and the action and behavior of public officials; third, by building social capital and enabling citizens to identify and articulate their values, beliefs, civic norms and democratic practices; fourth, by mobilizing particular constituencies, particularly the vulnerable and marginalized sections of masses, to participate more fully in politics and public affairs; and fifth, by development work to improve the wellbeing of their own and other communities.
Underscoring the importance of civil society, Thomas Jefferson asserted:
I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from them, but inform their discretion."
From the above assertion, ultimate power resides with the people-the civil society. In measured doses, they control the exercise of that power through constructive engagements with political power holders. In most cases critical policy decisions are better fashioned out when they are subjected to the crucible of civil society debates and criticism. Thus the power exercised by the electorate via the ballot box; the criticism to which public policies are subjected, the debates carried out by NGOs, CSOs and faith-based organizations verge onpolitical legitimacy.
CSOs: From Modern to Post-Modernism
The concept of civil society (a sphere regulated by the civilcode) has been changing over time. Hegel [7]believes that civil society is the realm of economic relationships as they exist in the modern industrial capitalist society. Viewed from this perspective, civil society had emerged at the particular period of capitalism and served its interests: individual rights and private property. For Hegel, civil society manifested contradictory forces. Being the realm of capitalist interests, there is a possibility of conflicts and inequalities within it. Hegel's contention is that the inequalities inherent in capitalism made it imperative for people to establish relations to ensure society is efficiently run.
For Marx, civil society was the 'base' where productive forces and social relations were taking place, whereas political society was the 'superstructure. Like Hegel, Karl Marx establishes a link between capitalism and civil society. Marx posits that the political society – the superstructure represents the interests of the bourgeoisie, the dominant class under capitalism. Karl Marx deviated a bit from Hegel when he visualized that the state cannot be a neutral problem solver, but a defender of the interest of the bourgeoisie.[8]
AntonioGramsci (Edwards 2004:10)[9]in his view did not consider civil society as coterminous with the socio-economic base of the state. Rather, Gramsci located civil society in the political superstructure. He espoused the crucial role of civil society as the contributor of the cultural and ideological capital required for the survival of the hegemony of capitalism. Gramsci therefore viewed civil society as the site for problem-solving. Such roles according to Neo-liberal thinkers include defending people against the state and the market and in asserting the democratic will to influence the state. In addition, Neo-liberal thinkers consider civil society as a site for struggle to subvert authoritarian regimes. Within the context of a democratic society, civil society constitutes a strong pillar as a defender of rights, protector of liberties, and all paraphernalia of good governance.
Post-modern thinkers after the collapse of the Soviet Union, hold the view that the concept of civil society is a neo-liberal ideology legitimizing development of the third sector as a substitute for the welfare state. The Washington Consensus of the 1990s, which involved conditioned loans by the World Bank and IMF to debt-laden developing states, also created pressures for states in poorer countries to shrink. Since then, greater emphasis on “civil society” as a panacea, replacing the state's service provision and social care though not the magic bullet as some social reformers may want us to believe. [10]
By the end of the 1990s civil society was seen less as a panacea amid the growth of the anti-globalization movement and the transition of many countries to democracy; instead, civil society was increasingly called on to justify its legitimacy and democratic credentials. This led to the creation by the UN of a high level panel on civil society. With the emergence of nongovernmental organizations and the New Social Movements (NSMs)[11]on a global scale in the 1990's, civil society became a platform for strategic action to construct 'an alternative social and world order. Thus, civil society has become even more prominent with the resurgence of democracy in Africa, Asia and Latin America.
There have been very healthy arguments about the relevance or otherwise of CSO's
CSOs are also important in creating what is increasingly referred to as 'social capital'. “Social capital is… the web of associations, networks and norms (such as trust and tolerance) that enable people to cooperate with one another for the common good. Like economic and human capital, social capital is a productive asset that accumulates with use… the institutional arrangements and values which make up social capital constitute the foundation for good governance, economic prosperity and healthy societies” (Vaneklasen, 1994).
Arguments and Merits of CSOs
A UK based CSO; mySociety builds websites that give people simple, tangible benefits in the civic and community aspects of their lives and teaches the public and voluntary sectors, through demonstration, how to use the internet most efficiently to improve lives
• Work to persuade government that releasing data is ultimately beneficial, not costly
• Find a champion who will hope promote your cause within government
• Demonstrate the value that can be unlocked from the data that has been released
• If you can't get what you want, try and use what you have – e.g. Kenyan Hansard PDFs
Build simple, effective tools that deliver tangible
• Focus on simple approaches that deliver benefits – build use confidence by seeing positive results from their actions
• If good solutions already exist – government or non-government, don't try to replicate
• If a channel exists already, use it – don't necessarily ask for permission
Over the years there have been arguments in favour of CSOs. The dominant view is that CSOs are perceived as more flexible, participatory and responsive to local needs of the poor. There is the belief that State policies are typically urban based, delivering to politically favored areas (Lehmann, 1990). [12]
CSOs can potentially foster and support grassroots organizations to become more numerous, sizable, resourceful, and self-reliant. Also, grassroots contacts enable CSOs to provide critical information on potential crisis and thus contribute to early warning systems.
There is the cost effective argument. Typically, CSOs require less financial inputs than government agencies and therefore are more cost effective, an attribute that is important in financially constrained third world countries.
CSOs can be more resourceful and innovative as they involve local communities in the identification and resolution of development problems which are more cost effective, more sustainable, and more compatible with community values and norms.
Over and above these direct development roles, CSOs also have a very important advocacy role to play in promoting effective governance.
CSOs, can potentially contribute to local economic development and respond to the growing challenge of poverty in a number of ways. CSOs can improve the local business investment climate; encourage new enterprises and livelihood programmes. Very committed CSOs can also deliver social services, provide training and capacity building programmes; and contribute to relief and rehabilitation in times of disaster.
CSOs and Nexus with Good Governance
Perhaps, the most conspicuous role played by CSOs is in the area articulating citizens' interests and demands is an important function performed by Civil Society Organizations, CSOs. The importance of CSO's can better be appreciated when state policies and the programs of government agencies do not take account sufficiently of needs of the poor or of some other vulnerable sections. CSOs bridge the gap by way of representing the interest of the people. CSO's also engage in defending the rights of the down-trodden especially groups that suffer extreme social exclusion.
CSOs that are virile are capable of articulating the interests and demands of is a key function served by almost every civil society organization. While political scientists have traditionally ascribed the function of interest articulation to political parties, such parties are not always strong in developing countries, and even where they are strong, they do not always represent the interests of the poor.
CSOs play the critical role in mobilizing social capital. Social capital is a resource that any community possesses to some level and it can help in resolving multiple problems of a collective nature. Like any other resource, however, social capital also needs to be activated and it needs to be combined with other kinds of resources, including physical, financial and human resources. CSOs can improve the accountability profile of governments.
Accountability has three dimensions: financial accountability implies an obligation of the persons handling resources, public offices or any other position of trust to report on the intended and actual use of the resources. Political accountability implies regular and open methods of sanctioning or rewarding those who hold positions of public trust through a system of checks and balances. Administrative accountability implies system of control internal to the government including civil service standards and incentives, ethical codes and administrative reviews UN (1996) [13]
At the level of society, there is need to promote communication between citizens based groups and community members. The level and periodicity of such interactions between CSOs and communities need to be strengthened. CSOs need also to build capacity for monitoring how local operators of donor programmes utilize donor fund. Wanting to know how local operators of donor projects and foundations spend their funds and how well the projects are run is both reasonable and necessary, because local operators of donor projects may divert from the original goals of the donor.
Through the free flow of information, which is clear and accessible, civil society groups, particularly a vibrant press, can serve as a monitoring mechanism to ensure that government. Policies are carried out in a manner intended and thereby significantly contribute to good governance.
The level of community participation in development projects and programmes increases Community participation is now generally seen as providing several major benefits to project and programme managers, especially in times of budget distress and structural adjustment. First, it can lead to increased mobilization of financial and non-financial resources (labour, material, information). Second, it can make for greater effectiveness in planning and implementation of development initiatives, by adapting them to local circumstances. Third, it can help to improve the maintenance of assets and infrastructure through local resource contribution and management. Fourth, community participation can contribute to local experience in providing local services, and hence stimulate the development of other forms of local institutions. This is another area CSOs have a role to play. Synergy between government and CSOs is capable of enhancing accountability and more equitable distribution of benefits.
Challenges facing CSOs in Nigeria
In Nigeria, CSOs face numerous challenges. The most pronounced among such problems is the allegation that civil society organizations often lack competent administrators and technicians, or financial and material resources. In intermediary NGOs, with often unclear structures of accountability, their anchorage in local society and their legitimacy can vary greatly hence they are subject to abuses. [14]
Many CSOs and NGOs are highly dependent on foreign aid, which often reinforces their already weak systems of accountability to those for whose benefit they ostensibly exist. From the modus operandi of most CSOs in Nigeria, it is obvious that a great many of them are small, localized, and uncoordinated hence they can hardly key into State and national development policies. With a very weak organizational structure and porous financial base, most CSOs find it difficult to engage in effective advocacy work.
In Nigeria, because of our languid road to democracy and most civil society organizations are distrustful of their governments and their policies. This tendency has been exacerbated by the history of grassroots interaction with governments, which is filled with broken promises, indifference, corruption, and clientelism. It is not surprising therefore that some CSOs are cynical and even reluctant to deal with governments. Again, when such NGOs tend to go it alone, they lack the capacity to achieve their goals. This is due largely to the fact that they can hardly create an environment. However a critical advantage that CSOs usually have over state-sponsored organizations concerns their ability to tap, effectively and legitimately, into societies' reservoirs of social capital.
Another challenge is that Clear lines of relationship between civil society and the state is yet to be established in many developing countries; the pattern of relationship is constantly in a flux (cooperative, conflictual, integrative or even nonexistent), depending on the context and issues involved. Many governments in the developing world are yet to come to terms with the role CSOs should play. Equally CSOs still need to learn how well to apply themselves to government issues. Both sides need more education on the art and practice of participatory governance.
Some CSOs have an undeniable role to play in modern democracy but because of their confrontational posturing, public office holders find it difficult to dialogue with them. The panacea should be that CSOs should accept that partnership is a more useful tool in their dealings with government. Indeed unlearning absolutism and militarism and learning cooperation and consultation are the major challenges in this regard
Good politics is not necessarily good economics; legislators and civil society advance interests of their constituents, which may be too narrowly focused and short-sighted to reflect the overall national interest. Thus their participation in the budget debate skews choices away from what is best for the country. It is the executive's mandate to produce the budgets; active participation by CSOs and the legislature may cause unnecessary delay without necessarily improving the budget process.
Conclusion & Recommendations:
From the dry, arid desert in Northern Nigeria to the blood stained creeks of the Niger Delta, the loud chorus of poverty, hunger and deprivation seems to rent the sky. That explains why 52ears after independence, the ILO and World Bank were comfortable to report that two-third or 86 percent of the 160 million populations live below the poverty line, and less than 50 percent of Nigerians has access to safe water and health facilities. The literacy index is generally deteriorating and efforts to improve the situation are undermined by poverty. [15]
In the realm of good governance, Nigeria has a lot to do to re-engineer her electoral system. Our politics is bereft of sound value-orientation and ideological underpinning. That is why some civil society organizations engage in criminal silence in spite of the large scale corruption pervading the land. Akinkugbe (2003)[16]rightly observed that:
In the four decades of Nigeria's political independence, we have witnessed a steady decline in values, quality of governance, commitment and the integrity of our environment. Our society has become negatively permissive and much passes for norm today that would have caused a raising of eyebrows in yonder years”.
In 2005, both ActionAid and DevNet independently applied to implement the Civil Society Index in Nigeria and subsequently decided to collectively undertake the project. The main objective of the CSI is to assess the state of civil society in Nigeria in order to enhance the strength and sustainability of civil society and to strengthen civil society's contribution to positive social change. An important outcome of the CSI process was generating and sharing useful and relevant knowledge on the state of civil society as well as increasing the capacity and commitment of civil society stakeholders towards the strengthening of civil society..[17]
Monitoring and Oversight: CSOs should not be exempted from monitoring and traditional oversight. The registration requirements of CSOs should have renewal provisions that demand evidence of positive results produced and audited statements of accounts [18]
As a veritable step towards building sustainable cooperation and partnership between government and civil society groups in the country is a key requirement in this regard. To promote government/CSOs partnership, access to information on both sides should be guaranteed by law. For now, this will be facilitated by the Freedom of Information Act in existence. It is not enough to demand that government be open to citizens based groups, non-governmental organizations should also be ready to account for funds received from donors. This will promote mutual trust and reciprocity. [19]
In Kenya MZALENDO means “Keeping an eye on the Kenyan Parliament” The platform makes it possible for people to access to information on Bills, motions, hansard,attendance records with a view to condemning the entrenched culture of apathy towards politics. Mzalendois the only free Parliamentary Monitoring Site in Sub-Saharan Africa[20]. CSOs in Nigeria can borrow from such examples.
IT is recommended that given the need for a local funding base for civil society activities in Nigeria, the right to access to public funding for charitable purposes should be guaranteed by law. Such public funding should however be established within a politically neutral administrative framework, with well-defined criteria and procedures for accessing it.[21]
There is a need for a well-structured institutional arrangement for partnership between civil society organizations, government and MDAs. Such arrangements should make it easy for CSOs and other citizens-based groups to partner with government in policy formulation, implementation and monitoring with the ultimate goal of promoting transparency and accountability.[22]
In Nigeria, there are very visible areas of contention in the polity. There is the knotty challenge of revenue allocation among the three tiers of government verging on the operation of an equitable fiscal federalism Issues of Federal Character concerning federal character in key government appointments and distribution of federal projects. Year back, our leadership promised to entrench a just, egalitarian and equitable society. Now, good governance as expressed in popular participation, in decision-making, transparency and accountability in the management of fiscal resources is at its embryonic stage. We need committed, vehement and well structured advocacy on these areas. One of such urgent areas is the achievement of the MDGs and specifically poverty alleviation.[23]
I have not given up on Nigeria (maybe you have given up). The challenges we face as a nation are the litmus test of our collective resolve to live together. Invariably, as we walk on the thorny path to nationhood, though at a snail speed, I am confident that the centripetal forces are beginning to overwhelm those forces that threaten to tear us apart. We shall remain united, resolved and committed to solve our common problems with even greater vigour. When CSOs work in synergy with government to protect human rights, strengthen government institutions, alleviate poverty, combat corruption and promote an open government, the benefits will far outweigh the sacrifices.
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8 Important Functions and Role of “Interest Groups” in Politics
Article shared by Saheb D
Each Pressure Group is organised for securing and promoting the accepted common interest or interests of its members. Consequently, it is the basic function of each pressure group to secure its interests. However, for performing this function, each group has to act and react, and perform several functions.
These groups, though non-partisan in character, participate in politics. These act to maintain the unity and solidarity of their members. They are involved in elections, though indirectly and only for securing their interests and not political power.
They try to influence the rule-making, rule-application and rule-adjudication structures.
We can broadly study the functions and role of pressure groups under the following heads:
1. Functions of Interest Groups as Interest Articulation Structures:
The first step in political process is the making of demands upon the political decision-makers by the people. This is done by them through their groups. Groups bring the claims of the people to the notice of the decision-makers. The process by which the claims of the people get crystallized and articulated is called interest articulation. Pressure groups or interest groups play a key role in this process.
There are a variety of ways in which the interest articulation is performed by the groups. Associational groups are always involved in interest articulation through regular and legal channels; the anomic interest groups perform this function only at times.
Likewise, the nature, role and level of participation of various interest groups in the process of interest articulation differ from system to system and within a system from time to time.
2. Functions of Interest Groups as agents of Political Socialisation, Participation, Communication and Recruitment:
Pressure groups are agents of political socialisation in so far as they influence the orientations of the people towards the political process. They play an important role in the transmission of cultural values and in influencing the behaviour of the people in politics. They are the factors of sociological and psychological environment of the political system.
Through participation in the group activities and by influencing the nature of political process the members of various groups get engaged in political participation. Similarly, these groups play a vital role as two-way communication links between the people and the government.
The training that the members of the groups undergo as its office bearers or active members enables and encourages them to take up political roles. It is in this way that pressure groups perform the function of political recruitment.
3. Role of Interest Groups in Elections:
To contest elections is the function of the political parties and not of the pressure groups. Pressure groups, by nature are non-partisan groups. Nevertheless, these indirectly play a crucial role in elections. When the political parties are selecting their candidates, these groups try to influence the choice.
These try to get nominations for only such candidates as are considered sympathetic to their interests. In the words of V.O. Key, “Groups tend to develop behind the non-partisan facade to perform the functions of recruiting and backing candidates”. Dr. Johri also remarks, “The form taken by group politics at the time of war of nominations is a matter of tricks and tactics.”
The groups are the objects of election campaigns organised by the political parties. Each political party tries to tap the organised bases of groups for increasing its support and strength in elections. The interest groups always try to secure the defeat of ‘unhelpful’ candidates. Election month is a bargaining month for the groups.
They try for the inclusion of favourable provisions in the election manifestoes of political parties. After elections, the pressure groups try to influence the choice of ministers from amongst the elected members.
Thus, each pressure group always tries to influence the outcome of elections without getting directly involved in the election process and electoral politics. These play a hide and seek game during elections.
4. Role of Interest Groups in the Party Politics:
In a political system, there is present a continuous process of interactions between political parties and pressure groups. The latter are always at work to influence the policies and activities of a political party (usually the majority party) or parties in such a way as can help them to secure their interests.
The former are also continuously engaged in attempts to secure the support, cooperation and resources of the organised groups in order to strengthen their respective chances in the political struggle.
It the process of politics, both have to depend upon the help and cooperation of each other. Both influence each other’s activities. Either the groups combine to form or support a political party as a political counterpart of their organisation or coalition, or a political party controls some groups and thereby impart a politico-ideological content to their activity.
Analysing the interactions between interest groups and political parties Gabriel A. Almond observes, “The result is not only a process of interaction and interpretation. When the party controls groups it inhibits the capacity of groups to formulate pragmatic specific demands but when groups control a party, they inhibit the capacity of a party to combine specific interests into programmes with wider appeal.”
“Pressure groups do not themselves,” writes Henry A. Turner, “draft party programmes or nominate candidates for public office. Pressure associations do, however, appear before the resolution committees of the political parties, to urge the endorsement of their programmes as planks in the party’s platforms.
They often attempt to secure the endorsement of all the major parties and thus remove their programme from the arena of partisan controversy. Many groups are also active in the nomination and election of party members to public offices.”
Groups also work with political parties, although some pretence is usually taken to preserve a facade of neutrality, so that a group will not be denied access to decision-makers for aligning itself solely with any one party. Thus, pressure groups play an important role in party politics.
5. Interest/Pressure Groups and Legislation:
Interest/Pressure groups play a vital role in the legislative process, not only as important structures of interest articulation, but also as active agencies engaged in lobbying with the legislators for securing desired laws or amendments in laws and policies of the government.
Right from the time of preparation of election manifestoes of various political parties to the passing of laws by the legislators, the pressure groups remain associated with the process of rule-making. Besides involvement in the process of inducting “favoured candidates” into the legislature, the groups try to influence the direction of parliamentary debates through press, propaganda and lobbying.
They try to influence the members of the opposition to put questions for eliciting information from the government about subjects of their interests. They submit petitions to the legislature and try to secure governmental assurances on the floor of the house. Such a role of pressure groups is effectively at work in a parliamentary system of government.
In a presidential system, since the government is not represented in the legislature, the pressure groups try to play a more vigorous role in the legislative process indirectly through lobbying with the legislators and also through resort to several available techniques like getting bills introduced in the legislature, e.g., in the American political system, they try to use the practices of pork-barrel log-rolling, filibustering, gerrymandering, etc. for securing their interests. They fruitfully exploit the discussions in the committee rooms of the legislature to their advantage. Thus, pressure groups play an important role in the legislative process.
6. Pressure Groups and Administration:
Pressure Groups are actively involved with the process of administration. The important role played by the organised associations, unions, and trade unions of the civil servants is a well known fact. Civil Servants are the real personnel behind the political executive, who manage the day-to-day administration and policies of the government.
Their interest groups as well as the interest groups enjoying their sympathies and goodwill play an influential role in the policy-making and running of administration. Through lobbying with the bureaucracy, the pressure groups are usually in a position to influence the process of policy implementation. They influence the working of the departmental committees constituted for advice and consultation.
In the words of Holtzman, “An executive unit that serves or regulates part of the general public need the cooperation of those who are the recipients of its activities. As active organised units representing such recipients interest groups have much to offer to an administrative bureaucracy.
They may furnish special staff service for which the agency has neither the appropriation nor the skill. They feed back to the administrator the feelings and discontent of those most affected by his agency.”
Likewise, Interest/Pressure groups try to influence the work of the political executive directly as well as indirectly through the legislature. Directly, the pressure groups, through public protest movements, pressure tactics, lobbying, propaganda and use of mass media, try to influence policy-making and decision-making on the part of the political executive.
The political executive often relies upon the advice and information supplied by the interest groups. While undertaking delegated legislation, the executive usually consults the interest groups.
Indirectly, the interest/pressure groups influence the working of the executive through the activities and the work of the legislature. They play an instrumental role in influencing the legislator in favour of taking the executive to task in respect of both the acts of commission as well as omission. Under the influence of the pressure groups, the legislators can take steps to force or induce favourable changes in governmental policies.
Thus, the groups play an important role in the working of the executive. They definitely influence policy-making, decision-making and administration of laws and rules.
7. Interest/Pressure Group’s role in Judicial Administration:
Pressure groups do not hesitate to affect the work of the judiciary. Their penetration into the judicial system is a well known fact of the contemporary era of democracy. Groups try to use the judicial system for securing and safeguarding their interests. Since judiciary in a democratic system is the guardian of the rights and liberty of the people, interest groups often seek access to the court for the redress of their grievances against the government as well as for getting declared a particular decision or policy as unconstitutional. They try to use the system of judicial review to get the unsuited laws and policies rejected as unlawful.
Pressure groups also try to influence the appointments and transfers of judges. This is done through lobbying with the executive. Use of press and other means of mass media to influence the thinking of the judges are also practised by the groups. Thus, groups play an indirect role in the working of the judicial system.
8. Interest Groups and Public Opinion:
Pressure groups play a leading role in the formulation of public opinion. Each pressure group is continuously engaged in evaluating all such laws, rules, decisions and policies which have a direct or indirect bearing on the interests it represents. It always places the pros and cons not only before its members but also before the general public for eliciting popular support as well as for catching the attention of the government.
Means of mass media are fully exploited for this purpose? The whole exercise goes a long way to determine public opinion on various issues and problems. Pressure groups like political parties play an important role in the formulation and moulding of public opinion.
REFERENCES REPRODUCTIONS
The impact of interest groups on public policy
The Role of Civil Society Organizations in Promoting Good Governance
8 Important Functions and Role of “Interest Groups” in Politics
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